"Positive" Results Increase Down the Hierarchy of the Sciences by Fanelli, Daniele
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"Positive" Results Increase Down the Hierarchy of the Sciences
Citation for published version:
Fanelli, D 2010, '"Positive" Results Increase Down the Hierarchy of the Sciences' PLoS One, vol 5, no. 3,
e10068., 10.1371/journal.pone.0010068
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1371/journal.pone.0010068
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
PLoS One
Publisher Rights Statement:
© 2010 Daniele Fanelli. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
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Abstract
The hypothesis of a Hierarchy of the Sciences with physical sciences at the top, social sciences at the bottom, and biological
sciences in-between is nearly 200 years old. This order is intuitive and reflected in many features of academic life, but
whether it reflects the ‘‘hardness’’ of scientific research—i.e., the extent to which research questions and results are
determined by data and theories as opposed to non-cognitive factors—is controversial. This study analysed 2434 papers
published in all disciplines and that declared to have tested a hypothesis. It was determined how many papers reported a
‘‘positive’’ (full or partial) or ‘‘negative’’ support for the tested hypothesis. If the hierarchy hypothesis is correct, then
researchers in ‘‘softer’’ sciences should have fewer constraints to their conscious and unconscious biases, and therefore
report more positive outcomes. Results confirmed the predictions at all levels considered: discipline, domain and
methodology broadly defined. Controlling for observed differences between pure and applied disciplines, and between
papers testing one or several hypotheses, the odds of reporting a positive result were around 5 times higher among papers
in the disciplines of Psychology and Psychiatry and Economics and Business compared to Space Science, 2.3 times higher in
the domain of social sciences compared to the physical sciences, and 3.4 times higher in studies applying behavioural and
social methodologies on people compared to physical and chemical studies on non-biological material. In all comparisons,
biological studies had intermediate values. These results suggest that the nature of hypotheses tested and the logical and
methodological rigour employed to test them vary systematically across disciplines and fields, depending on the complexity
of the subject matter and possibly other factors (e.g., a field’s level of historical and/or intellectual development). On the
other hand, these results support the scientific status of the social sciences against claims that they are completely
subjective, by showing that, when they adopt a scientific approach to discovery, they differ from the natural sciences only
by a matter of degree.
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Introduction
Although it is still controversial, the idea of a Hierarchy of the
Sciences is nearly 200 years old [1,2,3]. Philosopher and historian
of science August Comte (1798–1857) first suggested that scientific
disciplines differed systematically in the complexity and generality
of their subject of study, in the precision with which these subjects
are known, and in their level of intellectual and historical
development. Comte hypothesised a rank order in which what
he called ‘‘celestial physics’’ (astronomy) preceded ‘‘terrestrial
physics’’ (physics and chemistry), followed by ‘‘organic physics’’
(biology) and ‘‘social physics’’ (which he later renamed sociology)
[1,4]. Comte believed that sociology was the queen of all
disciplines and the ultimate goal of all research, but also the most
complex and least developed of the sciences [4].
Similar ideas have been proposed by contemporaries of Comte
(e.g. William Whewell [5]) and by modern philosophers and
sociologists of science who, for example, have distinguished
between ‘‘hard’’ and ‘‘soft’’ sciences [6,7], different levels of
‘‘empiricism’’ [8], different levels of ‘‘codification’’ [9], ‘‘pre- and
post-paradigmatic’’ sciences [10], and argued that fields of
research differ in the level of agreement on a single set of theories
and methodologies [10], the rigour with which data is related to
theory [7], the extent to which the choice of problems and
decisions made in solving problems are based upon cognitive as
opposed to non-cognitive criteria [11], the level of ‘‘consensus on
the significance of new knowledge and the continuing relevance of
old’’ [9], their explanatory success [12]. These scholars did not
always endorse the exact same definitions and hierarchies, but they
all shared an intuition that here we will summarize as follows: in
some fields of research (which we will henceforth indicate as
‘‘harder’’) data and theories speak more for themselves, whereas in
other fields (the ‘‘softer’’) sociological and psychological factors –
for example, scientists’ prestige within the community, their
political beliefs, their aesthetic preferences, and all other non-
cognitive factors – play a greater role in all decisions made in
research, from which hypothesis should be tested to how data
should be collected, analyzed, interpreted and compared to
previous studies.
The hypothesised Hierarchy of the Sciences (henceforth HoS) is
reflected in many social and organizational features of academic life.
When 222 scholars rated their perception of similarity between
academic disciplines, results showed a clustering along three main
dimensions: a ‘‘hard/soft’’ dimension, which roughly corresponded
to the HoS; a ‘‘pure/applied’’ dimension, which reflected the
orientation of the discipline towards practical application; and a
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‘‘life/non-life’’ dimension [13]. These dimensions have been vali-
dated by many subsequent studies, which compared disciplines by
parameters including: average publication rate of scholars, level of
social connectedness, level of job satisfaction, professional commit-
ment, approaches to learning, goals of academic departments,
professional duties of department heads, financial reward structures
of academic departments, and even response rates to survey
questionnaires [14,15,16,17].
Numerous studies have taken a direct approach, and have
attempted to compare the hardness of two or more disciplines,
usually psychology or sociology against one or more of the natural
sciences. These studies used a variety of proxy measures including:
ratio of theories to laws in introductory textbooks, number of
colleagues acknowledged in papers, publication cost of interrupt-
ing academic career for one year, proportion of under 35 s who
received above-average citations, concentration of citations in the
literature, rate of pauses in lectures given to undergraduates,
immediacy of citations, anticipation of one’s work by colleagues,
average age when receiving the Nobel prize, fraction of journals’
space occupied by graphs (called Fractional Graph Area, or FGA),
and others [17,18]. According to a recent review, some of these
measures are correlated to one-another and to the HoS [2]. One
parameter, FGA, even appears to capture the relative hardness of
sub-disciplines: in psychology, FGA is higher in journals rated as
‘‘harder’’ by psychologists, and also in journals specialised in
animal behaviour rather than human behaviour [19,20,21].
Whether disciplines really differ in hardness and can be ranked
accordingly, however, is still controversial [3,12,21,22]. This
controversy is manifest, for example, in the debate on the
applicability of the scientific method within disciplines like
psychology or sociology. At one extreme are researchers that
approach the social sciences like any other and test hypotheses
through laboratory and field experiments; at the other extreme,
eminent scholars argue that the social sciences are qualitatively
different from other disciplines and that scientific objectivity within
them is purely a myth [23,24,25,26,27]. Radically anti-hierarchy
positions have been developed within the ‘‘second wave’’ of
science studies and its ‘‘postmodern’’ derivations, according to
which all scientific knowledge is ‘‘socially constructed’’ and thus
not different from any other form of knowledge, faith or politics
[28,29]. Under this perspective, all the empirical measures of
hardness listed above could be re-interpreted as just reflecting
cultural differences between ‘‘academic tribes’’ [30].
Several lines of evidence support a non-hierarchical view of the
sciences. The consensus between scientists within a field, measured
by several independent parameters including level of agreement in
evaluating colleagues and research proposals, is similar in physics
and sociology [3]. The heterogeneity of effect sizes in meta-
analyses also appears to be similar in the physical and the social
sciences, suggesting a similar level of empirical cumulativeness
[22]. Historical reconstructions show that scientific controversies
are common at the frontier of all fields, and the importance and
validity of experiments is usually established in hindsight, after a
controversy has settled [31,32]. Analysis of molecular biology
papers showed that the interpretation of experiments is heavily
influenced by previously published statements, regardless of their
verity [33]. In evolutionary biology, published estimates on the
heritability of sexually selected traits in various species were low for
many years, but then suddenly increased when new mathematical
models predicted that heritability should be high [34]. Cases of
‘‘pathological science’’, in which a wrong theory or non-existent
phenomenon are believed for many years and are ‘‘supported’’ by
empirical data, have been observed in all fields, from parapsy-
chology to physics [35].
The contrast between indirect measures of hardness, which
point to a hierarchy, and evidence of high controversy and
disagreement in all kinds of research has inspired an intermedi-
ate position, which distinguishes between the ‘‘core’’ and the
‘‘frontier’’ of research. The core is the corpus of agreed upon
theories and concepts that researchers need to know in order to
contribute to the field. Identifiable with the content of advanced
university textbooks, the core is clearly more developed and
structured in the physical than in the social sciences [11,36]. The
frontier is where research is actually done, where scientists produce
new data and concepts, most of which will eventually be
contradicted or forgotten and will never make it to the core. At
the frontier, levels of uncertainty and disagreement might be
similar across fields [3,36].
The question, therefore, is still unanswered: does a Hierarchy of
the Sciences really exist? Does the hardness of research vary
systematically across disciplines? This study compared scientific
papers at the frontier of all disciplines using an intuitive proxy of
bias. Papers that declared to have tested a hypothesis were
sampled at random from all 10837 journals in the Essential
Science Indicators database, which univocally classifies them in 22
disciplines. It was then determined whether the authors of each
paper had concluded to have found a ‘‘positive’’ (full or partial) or
a ‘‘negative’’ (no or null) support for the tested hypothesis. The
frequency of positive and negative results was then compared
between disciplines, domains and methodological categories.
Papers were classified by discipline based on the journal in which
they were published. Disciplinary categories (e.g. pure/applied,
life/non-life, etc…) followed previous classifications based on the
perception of scholars [13,14,15,16,17]. Methodological categories
are based on very general characteristics of the object of study and
the parameters measured in each paper. The term ‘‘methodolo-
gy’’, therefore, in this paper is used in its broadest possible sense of
‘‘system of methods and principles used in a particular discipline’’
[37].
Since papers were selected at random with respect to all factors,
the proportion of positive results in this sample is a proxy of the
level of confirmation bias. Scientists, like all other human beings,
have an innate tendency to confirm their expectations and the
hypotheses they test [38]. This confirmation bias, which operates
largely at the subconscious level, can affect the collection, analysis,
interpretation and publication of data [39,40] and thus contribute
to the excess of positive results that has been observed in many
fields [38,41,42,43,44]. In theory, application of the scientific
method should prevent these biases in all research. In practice,
however, in fields where theories and methodologies are more
flexible and open to interpretation, bias is expected to be higher
[45].
In sum, if the HoS hypothesis is correct, scientists in harder
fields should accept more readily any result their experiments
yield, while those in softer fields should have more freedom to
choose which theories and hypotheses to test and how to analyze
and interpret their own and their colleagues’ results. This freedom
should increase their chances to ‘‘find’’ in the data what they
believe to be true (see the Discussion section for a detailed
analysis), which leads to the prediction that papers will report
more negative results in the harder sciences than in the softer.
Results
A total of 2434 papers were included in the analysis. No paper
testing a hypothesis was retrieved from mathematical journals,
and the ‘‘multidisciplinary’’ category (which includes journals like
Nature, Science, PNAS, etc…) was excluded. Therefore, the sample
Hierarchy of Positive Results
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represented 20 of the 22 disciplines in the Essential Science
Indicators database (Fig. 1). Overall, 2045 papers (84%) reported a
positive or partial support for the tested hypothesis. Positive results
were distributed non-randomly between disciplines (X2= 61.934.
df= 19, p,0.0001).
Negative results by discipline, dimension and domain
Space Science had the lowest percentage of positive results
(70.2%) and Psychology and Psychiatry the highest (91.5%). The
overlap between disciplines in the physical, biological and social
sciences was considerable (Fig. 1), yet the rank observed (based on
the frequency of positive results) and that predicted by the
hypothesis (physical = I, biological = II and social sciences = III)
tended to correlate when all disciplines were included (Kendall’s
t-c = 0.35360.194SE, T=1.813, p= 0.07), and were significantly
correlated when only pure disciplines [13,14,16] were included
(t-c = 0.56860.184SE, T= 3.095, p = 0.002). Applied disciplines
showed no significant trend (t-c = 0.06160.364SE, T= 0.168,
p = 0.867).
Of the three disciplinary dimensions identified by previous
studies [13,14,16], the hard/soft and the pure/applied dimensions
were significantly associated with the frequency of positive results
(Figure 2). The odds among soft disciplines were over 50% higher
than among hard sciences (OR(95%CI) = 1.529(1.037–2.116),
p = 0.011). The odds of reporting a positive result among papers
published in hard-applied, soft-pure and soft-applied disciplines
[13,14,16] were around 70% higher than among hard-pure
disciplines (Fig. 2). The life/non-life dimension was not signif-
icantly associated with the frequency of positive results alone
(X2 = 2.675, p = 0.102; power to detect a small effect (Cohen’s
w=0.1) = 0. 998), but it was when controlling for the other two
dimensions (Wald = 5.493, p = 0.019, OR(95%CI) of life vs.
non-life = 1.327(1.047-1.681)).
The disciplinary domain of a paper was a significant pre-
dictor of positive results when all disciplines were included
(Wald = 9.335, df = 2, p = 0.009, OR(95%CI) of biological vs.
physical sciences = 1.228(0.962-1.569), OR(95%CI) of social vs.
physical sciences = 1.754(1.220-2.522)). When only pure disci-
plines were included, the effect was stronger (N= 1691,
Wald = 13.34, p = 0.001, OR(95%CI) of biological vs. physical
sciences = 1.387(1.041-1.847), OR(95%CI) or social vs. physical
sciences = 2.207(1.431-3.402)). Among applied disciplines, howev-
er, positive results were uniformly high and not significantly
different (N= 743, Wald = 0.110, p = 0.946; power to detect a
small (OR=1.5), medium (OR=2.5) and large effect (OR=4.5),
respectively = 0.343, 0.89 and 0.996; OR(95%CI) of biological vs.
physical sciences = 1.068(0.66-1.727), OR(95%CI) of social vs.
physical = 1.105(0.565-2.161)) (Fig. 3).
Negative results by methodological category
The methodology of papers varied significantly between
disciplines (X2 = 4271.298, df = 152, p,0.001), but there was also
considerable within-discipline variability, particular among the
physical and biological sciences (Fig. 4).
Methodological category was a significant predictor of positive
results both when all disciplines and only pure disciplines were
included (respectively, Wald = 37.943 and Wald= 33.834, df = 8,
p,0.001), but not when only applied disciplines were included
(Wald = 9.328, p= 0.315; power to detect a small, medium and
large effect, respectively 0.18, 0.575 and 0.867) (Fig. 5). Including
all disciplines, behavioural/social studies on humans (whether or
not they included non-behavioural methods) reported significantly
more positive results than behavioural studies on non-humans
Figure 1. Positive Results by Discipline. Name of discipline,
abbreviation used throughout the paper, sample size and percentage
of ‘‘positive’’ results (i.e. papers that support a tested hypothesis).
Classification by discipline was based on the Essential Science Indicators
database, the hard/soft, pure/applied and life/non-life categories were
based on previous literature (see text for details). Error bars represent
95% logit-derived confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.g001
Figure 2. Positive Results by Disciplinary Dimension. Number of
papers that supported (white) or failed to support (black) a tested
hypothesis, classified by disciplinary categories based on dimensions
identified by previous studies (see text for explanations). Percentage in
each bar refers to positive results. OR=Odds Ratio (and 95%Confidence
Interval) of reporting a positive result compared to the reference
category of Hard/Pure disciplines. Chi square was calculated for each
dimension separately (for category composition see Fig. 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.g002
Hierarchy of Positive Results
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(tot N= 685, Wald= 9.669, df = 1, p= 0.002, OR(95%CI) =
2.046(1.303–3.213), while no difference between human and non-
human was observed among biological, non-behavioural studies
(tot N=1328, Wald= 0.232, df = 1, p= 0.630, OR(95%CI) =
1.088(0.771–1.537); power to detect a small, medium and large
effect, respectively = 0.551, 0.991 and 0.999). These latter reported
significantly more positive results than behavioural studies on
non-humans (tot N=1511, Wald= 4.764, df= 1, p= 0.029,
OR(95%CI)= 1.541(1.045–2.273).
Confounding factors and corrected Odds-Ratios
Positive and negative results were not significantly associated
with the five-year impact factor of the journal standardized by
discipline (N=2273, Student’s t (equal variances not assumed) =
-1.356, df = 511.827, p = 0.176; power to detect a small
effect = 0.968), nor to the year of publication (X2 = 11.413,
df = 7, p = 0.122, Cramer’s V=0.068; power to detect a small
effect = 0.97). Controlling for these two factors in regression
models did not alter the results in any relevant way.
The frequency of negative results in papers that tested multiple
hypotheses (N= 151, in which only the first hypothesis was
considered), was significantly higher than in papers testing only
one hypothesis (X2 = 13.591, df = 1, p,0.001). Multiple-hypothe-
ses papers were more frequent in the social than in the biological
and the physical sciences (respectively, 18.47% (number of
multiple papers N=76), 4.46% (N=62) and 1.87% (N=12),
X2 = 140.308, df = 2, p,0.001, Cramer’s V= 0.240), and were
most frequent in the discipline of Economics and Business (47%,
N=55). However, the frequency of negative results in multiple-
hypotheses papers was not significantly different between disci-
plines nor between disciplinary domains (respectively, X2 = 15.567
df = 17, p = 0.555, V= 0.322, and X2 = 4.303, df = 2, p = 0.116,
V= 0.169), although only large effects can be excluded with
significant confidence (power to detect a small, medium and large
effect, respectively = 0.09, 0.59 and 0.98 for disciplines; 0.18, 0.92,
0.99 for domains).
When correcting for the confounding effect of presence/absence
of multiple hypotheses, the odds of reporting a positive result were
around five times higher for papers published in Psychology and
Psychiatry and Economics and Business than in Space Science
(Table 1, Nagelkerke R2N= 0.051). When correcting for the
confounding effect of pure/applied discipline and presence/
absence of multiple hypotheses, the odds of reporting a positive
results were about 2.3 times significantly higher for papers in the
social sciences compared to the physical sciences (Table 2,
R2N= 0.030), and about 3.4 times significantly higher for
behavioural and social studies on people compared to physical-
chemical studies (Table 3, R2N= 0.045).
Figure 4. General Methodology by Discipline and by Domain. Methodology employed by papers in different disciplines and domains.
Methodological categories correspond to basic characteristics of the outcome: whether it measured physical/chemical parameters as opposed to
behavioural parameters, and whether the object of study was non-biological, biological non-human, or biological human (see Methods for further
details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.g004
Figure 3. Positive Results by Disciplinary Domain. Percentage of
papers that supported a tested hypothesis, classified by disciplinary
domain. Blue = including only pure disciplines, Red= including only
applied disciplines, Black = all disciplines included. Error bars represent
95% logit-derived confidence interval. For domain composition see
Figure 4.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.g003
Hierarchy of Positive Results
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Discussion
We analyzed a large sample of papers that, by declaring to have
tested a hypothesis, had placed themselves at the research frontier
of all disciplines and explicitly adopted the hypothetico-deductive
method of scientific inquiry, with its assumptions of objectivity and
rigour [24]. The frequency with which these papers reported a
positive result was significantly predicted by the hardness (as it is
perceived by scholars and suggested by numerous indirect
measures) of their discipline, domain, and overall methodology.
These results must be generated by a combination of factors that,
as will be discussed below, cannot be separated in this analysis.
Overall, however, they support the existence of a Hierarchy of the
Sciences, in which scientific rigour and objectivity are roughly
inversely proportional to the complexity of subject matter and
possibly other field-specific characteristics (e.g. level of development,
see below). On the other hand, the differences observed were only a
matter of degree. This supports the scientific status of the social
sciences against claims that they are qualitatively different from the
natural sciences and that a scientific method based on objectivity
cannot be applied to them [25,26,27].
Not all observations matched the predicted hierarchy, however.
At the disciplinary level, Psychology and Psychiatry had more
positive results than Social Sciences, General, contradicting previous
studies that placed psychology between biology and sociology
[18,21]. Moreover, Physics and Chemistry had more positive results
than Social Sciences, General and a few biological disciplines. At the
level of methodology, biological, non-behavioural studies on humans
and non-humans had more positive results than behavioural studies
on non-humans. At both levels, papers in applied disciplines showed
a markedly different pattern, having uniformly high frequencies of
positive results.
Overall, the predictive power of the regression models in this
study was highly significant statistically, but never exceeded a
5.1% reduction in error (although the validity of R2-equivalents in
logistic regression is controversial [46]). This value might appear
small, but it is comparable to the average variance explained, for
example, by ecological studies (which is between 2.5% and 5.4%
[47]). Moreover, it was obtained by using very broad categories as
predictors, which suggests that a higher predictive ability could be
achieved by more refined analyses that distinguished between
subfields and/or specific factors that might influence outcomes.
These factors, summarized below, are few and could be tested by
future studies.
The probability of a paper to report a positive result depends
essentially on three components: 1-whether the tested hypothesis
is actually true or false; 2-logical and methodological rigour with
Table 1. Logistic regression slope, standard error, Wald test
with statistical significance, Odds Ratio and 95% Confidence
Interval of the probability for a paper to report a positive
result, depending on the following study characteristics:
discipline of the journal in which the paper was published,
papers testing more than one hypothesis (only the first of
which was included in the study).
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. OR 95%CI OR
Discipline (all) 61.238 19 ,0.001
Geosciences 0.198 0.295 0.453 1 0.501 1.219 0.684–2.174
Environment/
Ecology
0.353 0.289 1.490 0.222 1.423 0.808–2.508
Plant and Animal
Sciences
0.472 0.277 2.900 1 0.089 1.604 0.931–2.761
Computer Science 0.711 0.390 3.329 1 0.068 2.036 0.949–4.372
Agricultural
Sciences
0.826 0.337 6.014 1 0.014 2.284 1.180–4.420
Physics 0.856 0.392 4.766 1 0.029 2.354 1.091–5.078
Neuroscience &
Behaviour
0.872 0.316 7.616 1 0.006 2.393 1.288–4.446
Microbiology 0.903 0.320 7.973 1 0.005 2.467 1.318–4.616
Chemistry 0.911 0.360 6.391 1 0.011 2.487 1.227–5.041
Social Sciences,
General
1.006 0.321 9.808 1 0.002 2.735 1.457–5.134
Immunology 0.984 0.323 9.311 1 0.002 2.676 1.422–5.035
Engineering 1.076 0.402 7.175 1 0.007 2.934 1.335–6.448
Mol. Biology &
Genetics
1.081 0.343 9.930 1 0.002 2.947 1.505–5.772
Economics &
Business
1.624 0.385 17.780 1 ,0.001 5.073 2.385–10.792
Biology &
Biochemistry
1.216 0.365 11.084 1 0.001 3.372 1.649–6.897
Clinical Medicine 1.286 0.355 13.090 1 ,0.001 3.618 1.803–7.262
Pharm. &
Toxicology
1.297 0.347 13.936 1 ,0.001 3.658 1.851–7.226
Materials Science 1.395 0.396 12.433 1 ,0.001 4.034 1.858–8.760
Psychiatry/
Psychology
1.569 0.372 18.427 1 ,0.001 4.935 2.381–10.230
Multiple hypotheses 20.877 0.221 15.756 1 ,0.001 0.416 0.27–0.642
Constant 0.856 0.214 15.962 1 ,0.001 2.355
The effect of discipline was tested for overall effect then each discipline was
contrasted to Space Science by indicator contrast.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.t001
Figure 5. Positive Results by Methodological Category. Percent-
age of papers that supported a tested hypothesis in pure (top) and
applied (bottom) disciplines, plotted by general characteristics of their
methodology (defined by the outcome, see also Fig. 4). The ‘‘other
methodology’’ category is not shown. Black = studies on non-human
material or subjects, Red = studies on human material or subjects. Error
bars represent 95% logit-derived confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.g005
Hierarchy of Positive Results
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which the hypothesis is linked to empirical predictions and tested;
3-statistical power to detect the predicted pattern (because low
statistical power decreases the probability to reject the ‘‘null’’
hypothesis of no effect [48]).
Statistical power -which is primarily a function of noise in the
data and sample size- is typically low in social, behavioural and
biological papers [49,50,51,52,53], and relatively high in disci-
plines like physics, chemistry or geology. These latter rarely use
inferential statistics at all, either because the outcomes are ‘‘yes’’ or
‘‘no’’ answers (e.g. presence or absence of specific chemical
compound in a rock) or because their data have such low levels of
noise to make any pattern unmistakable [22,54]. Based on
statistical power alone, therefore, the physical sciences should
yield as many or more positive results than the other sciences,
which should report more ‘‘null’’ results instead. It follows that the
differences observed must be caused by some combination of the
other two factors:
1-Truth value of the hypotheses tested
Hypotheses tested in biological and social sciences could have a
higher probability of being true. This is unlikely to be explained by
these sciences having stronger theories than the physical sciences
(as discussed in the introduction, these latter have, if anything, a
more developed and cumulative ‘‘core’’), or by these sciences
testing more trivial hypotheses (originality and innovativeness are
rewarded in all fields of research). More plausibly, the truth value
of tested hypotheses could differ (if indeed it does differ) because of
two sub-factors:
1A-Prior knowledge and beliefs
Scientists in softer sciences might chose their hypotheses based
on a greater amount of personal observations, preliminary results,
and pure and simple intuition that precede a ‘‘formal’’, published
‘‘test’’ of the hypothesis. How this might affect the objectivity of
research is unclear. On the one hand, accurate prior information
increases the likelihood that the tested hypothesis is true and
therefore, following Bayesian logic, reinforces the ‘‘positive’’
conclusion of an experiment. On the other hand, scientists’ prior
beliefs, whether or not they are based on accurate information,
introduce an element of arbitrariness and subjectivity in research,
and by reinforcing scientists’ expectations might also increase their
confirmation bias [55].
1B-Deepness of hypotheses tested
This has been suggested to reflect the level of ‘‘maturation’’ of a
science [56]. Younger, less developed fields of research should tend
to produce and test hypotheses about observable relationships
between variables (‘‘phenomenological’’ theories). The more a
field develops and ‘‘matures’’, the more it tends to develop and test
hypotheses about non-observable phenomena underlying the
observed relationships (‘‘mechanistic’’ theories). These latter kinds
of hypotheses reach deeper levels of reality, are logically stronger,
less likely to be true, and are more conclusively testable [56]. This
scheme aptly describes the scientific status of ecological studies
[40], and might contribute to explain not only the HoS, but also to
the differences observed between ‘‘pure’’ and ‘‘applied’’ disci-
plines, because these latter probably test more phenomenological
than mechanistic hypotheses.
2-Rigour with which hypotheses are linked to predictions
This can be further subdivided in four sub-factors:
2A-Flexibility in definitions, design, analysis and
interpretation of a research
In sciences that are younger and/or address phenomena of
higher complexity, the connection between theories, hypotheses
and empirical findings could be more flexible, negotiable and open
Table 3. Logistic regression slope, standard error, Wald test
with statistical significance, Odds Ratio and 95% Confidence
Interval of the probability for a paper to report a positive
result, depending on the following study characteristics:
methodological category, papers testing more than one
hypothesis (only the first of which was included in the study),
and papers published in pure as opposed to applied
disciplines.
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. OR 95%CI OR
Methodological
category (all)
40.048 8 ,0.001
Biological, Ph/Ch,
non-human
0.763 0.163 21.870 1 ,0.001 2.145 1.558–2.954
Biological, Ph/Ch,
human
0.750 0.205 13.449 1 ,0.001 2.117 1.418–3.161
Ph/Ch+Beh/Soc,
non-human
0.332 0.299 1.227 1 0.268 1.393 0.775–2.505
Ph/Ch+Beh/Soc,
human
1.164 0.425 7.499 1 0.006 3.201 1.392–7.362
Behavioural/Social,
non-human
0.497 0.287 2.991 1 0.084 1.643 0.936–2.885
Behavioural/Social,
human
1.213 0.213 32.421 1 ,0.001 3.364 2.215–5.107
Other, non human 0.469 0.284 2.738 1 0.098 1.599 0.917–2.788
Other, human 0.609 0.565 1.159 1 0.282 1.838 0.607–5.566
Multiple hypotheses 21.058 0.209 25.756 1 ,0.001 0.347 0.231–0.522
Pure discipline 20.343 0.134 6.599 1 0.01 0.709 0.546–0.922
Constant 1.303 0.177 53.93 1 ,0.001 3.682
Methodological category (see text for details) was tested for overall effect, then
each category was contrasted by indicator contrast to physical/chemical studies
on non-biological material.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.t003
Table 2. Logistic regression slope, standard error, Wald test
with statistical significance, Odds Ratio and 95% Confidence
Interval of the probability for a paper to report a positive
result, depending on the following study characteristics:
disciplinary domain, papers testing more than one hypothesis
(only the first of which was included in the study), and papers
published in pure as opposed to applied disciplines.
Variable B SE Wald df Sig. OR 95%CI OR
Domain (all) 17.805 2 ,0.001
Biological
sciences
0.297 0.127 5.487 1 0.019 1.346 1.05–1.726
Social sciences 0.813 0.194 17.519 1 ,0.001 2.256 1.541–3.301
Multiple
hypotheses
21.036 0.207 25.11 1 ,0.001 0.355 0.237–0.532
Pure discipline 20.490 0.131 14.031 1 ,0.001 0.613 0.474–0.792
Constant 1.803 0.136 176.034 1 ,0.001 6.071
Disciplinary domain was tested for overall effect, then biological and social
sciences were each contrasted to physical sciences by indicator contrast.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010068.t002
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to interpretation. This would give scientists more freedom in
deciding how to collect, analyze and interpret data, which
increases the chances that they will produce a support of the
hypotheses they believe to be true [45,57]. In its earliest stages of
development, a discipline or field can be completely fragmented
theoretically and methodologically, and have different schools of
thought that interpret the same phenomena in radically different
ways –a condition that seems to characterize many fields in the
social sciences and possibly some of the biological sciences [10,11].
2B-Prevalence and strength of experimenter effects and
self-fulfilling prophecies
The biasing effect of researchers’ expectations is increasingly
recognized in all disciplines including physics [58,59], but has been
most extensively documented in the behavioural sciences [60,61].
Indeed, behavioural data, which is inherently noisy and open to
interpretation, might be particularly at risk from unconscious
biases. Behavioural studies on people have an even higher risk of
bias because the subjects of study can be subconsciously aware of
researchers’ expectations, and behave accordingly [25,26,62].
Therefore, experimenter effects might explain why behavioural
studies yield more positive results on humans than non-humans.
2C-Non-publication of negative and/or statistically
non-significant results
These can remain unpublished because researchers prefer not to
submit them and/or because journal editors and peer reviewers are
more likely to reject them [63]. In fields that use statistical inference
to test the experimental hypothesis (which, as discussed above, tend
to be the ‘‘softer’’ ones), the positive-outcome bias overlaps with a
more generic bias against statistically non-significant results (i.e.
results that fail to reject the null hypothesis), which is well
documented in many disciplines [43]. This latter produces an
excess of positive results when the tested effect sizes are medium or
large. When effect sizes are very small, however, a pure bias against
non-significant results should not affect the direction of the outcome
(i.e. both positive and negative supports should be published, as long
as they are statistically significant) [48]. In this latter case, therefore,
a bias against non-significant results could generate an increase in
positive results only if researchers in softer sciences tested more
generic hypotheses (for example, ‘‘x is correlated to y’’ or ‘‘x influences
y’’ instead of ‘‘x is positively correlated to y’’ or ‘‘x causes y’’), and/or if
they adjusted their hypothesis after knowing the results (a
questionable practice sometimes defined as HARKing [64]). The
publication bias against negative and non-significant results can
have several causes. In particular, it is expected to be higher in less
developed sciences and in fields where the time-lag between
hypothesis formulation and testing is longer, because in such
conditions the paucity of conclusive empirical evidence is
compensated by a higher confirmation bias and ‘‘theory tenacity’’
of the scientific community [40].
2D-Prevalence and strength of manipulation of data and
results
Several factors are hypothesised to increase scientists’ propensity
to falsify research, including: the likelihood of being caught,
consequences of being caught, the costs of producing data
compared to publishing them, strong belief in one’s preferred
theories, financial interests, etc…[65,66,67,68]. Each of these
factors leads to straightforward predictions on where misconduct is
most likely to occur (e.g., in fields where competition is high,
replicability is low, conflicts of interest are high, etc…), which very
few studies to date have verified empirically. Survey data suggests
that outright scientific misconduct is relatively rare compared to
more subtle forms of bias, although it is probably higher than
commonly assumed, particularly in medical/clinical research [69].
Critics might argue that these results, like previous attempts to
measure the hardness of different fields, simply reflect cultural
differences between ‘‘academic tribes’’ [30]. However, this study is
different from previous ones because it measures a parameter linked
to the outcome of research itself. Future studies might show, for
example, that a specified discipline has a high frequency of positive
results largely because it has a ‘‘cultural tradition’’ of keeping negative
results in drawers (or of dropping outliers, or of HARKing, etc…).
Such a tradition, however, would have clear and direct consequences
for the reliability of the scientific literature in that discipline.
Perhaps the strongest counter-interpretation of these results
could be that scientists in different disciplines or fields use the
expression ‘‘test the hypothesis’’ in slightly different contexts. For
example, sociologists and molecular biologists might use it more
when they have positive results, while astronomers and physicists
when they have negative results. Although this possibility cannot
be ruled out, it seems unlikely to fully explain the patterns
observed in this study. Even if it did, then we would have to
explain why a certain use of words is correlated so strongly with
the hypothesised hardness of different fields and methodologies. In
particular, this would suggest that a falsificationist approach to
research [70] is applied differently (more rigorously) in the physical
sciences than in the biological and social sciences, ultimately
supporting the conclusion that the hierarchy of the sciences reflects
how research is done.
Papers testing multiple hypotheses were more likely to report a
negative support for the first hypothesis they presented. This
suggests that the order in which scientists list their hypotheses
follows a rhetorical pattern, in which the first hypothesis presented
is falsified in favour of a subsequent one. It also suggests that part
of the papers that in this study were classified as ‘‘negative
supports’’ were in fact reporting a positive result. Since papers
reporting multiple hypotheses were more frequent in the social
sciences, and particularly in the discipline of Economics and
Business, it is possible that these sciences yield more positive results
than it appears in this analysis. However, there was no statistically
significant difference between disciplines or domains and large
differences could be excluded with significant confidence, which
suggests that the rhetorical style is similar across disciplines.
A major methodological limitation of this study is the data
extraction protocol, because the classification of papers as positive
and negative was not blind to the papers’ discipline and
methodology. Therefore, the confirmation bias of the author
himself could not be controlled for. However, parallel analyses on
the same sample showed significant correlations between positive
results and independent parameters hypothesised to increase
scientific bias (Fanelli, submitted). The scoring of papers was
completely blind to these latter parameters, which suggests that the
proportion of positive results measured in this sample is a genuine
proxy of confirmation bias.
Given what sociologists have sometimes written about sociology
(e.g. that it is probably the only science where knowledge is truly
socially constructed [11]), economists of economics (e.g. that
econometrics is like alchemy, with regression analysis being it’s
philosopher’s stone [71]), and psychiatrists of psychology and
psychiatry (e.g. that they ‘‘pretend to be sciences, offering allegedly
empirical observations about the functions and malfunctions of the
human mind’’ [72]), it could be surprising to find any negative
results at all in these disciplines. As argued above, this study
suggests that such categorical criticisms of the social sciences are
excessive. However, at least two limitations need to be considered.
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First, this analysis is based on the assumption that scientists are
generally biased towards positive results, which is well documented
[38,41], but not always true. Scientists will sometimes be biased
against the hypothesis they are testing. The frequency with which
this occurs might vary by discipline and thus represent a
confounding variable. Second, and most importantly, the analysis
focussed on papers that explicitly embraced the scientific method
and are published in English-speaking scientific journals. Howev-
er, most of the research published in the social and behavioural
sciences is qualitative, descriptive or speculative, and is published
in monographs rather than journals, so it eludes the conclusions of
this study.
Materials and Methods
Data collection
The sentence ‘‘test* the hypothes*’’ was used to search all 10837
journals in the Essential Science Indicators database, which
classifies journals univocally in 22 disciplines. When the number of
papers retrieved from one discipline exceeded 150, papers were
selected using a random number generator. In one discipline,
Plant and Animal Sciences, an additional 50 papers were analysed,
in order to increase the statistical power of comparisons involving
behavioural studies on non-humans (see below for details on
methodological categories). By examining the abstract and/or full-
text, it was determined whether the authors of each paper had
concluded to have found a positive (full or partial) or negative (null
or negative) support. If more than one hypothesis was being tested,
only the first one to appear in the text was considered. We
excluded meeting abstracts and papers that either did not test a
hypothesis or for which we lacked sufficient information to
determine the outcome.
All data was extracted by the author. An untrained assistant
who was given basic written instructions (similar to the paragraph
above, plus a few explanatory examples) scored papers the same
way as the author in 18 out of 20 cases, and picked up exactly the
same sentences for hypothesis and conclusions in all but three
cases. The discrepancies were easily explained, showing that the
procedure is objective and replicable.
To identify methodological categories, the outcome of each
paper was classified according to a set of binary variables: 1-
outcome measured on biological material; 2- outcome measured
on human material; 3-outcome exclusively behavioural (measures
of behaviours and interactions between individuals, which in
studies on people included surveys, interviews and social and
economic data); 4-outcome exclusively non-behavioural (physical,
chemical and other measurable parameters including weight,
height, death, presence/absence, number of individuals, etc…).
Biological studies in vitro for which the human/non-human
classification was uncertain were classified as non-human.
Different combinations of these variables identified mutually
exclusive methodological categories: Physical/Chemical (1-N, 2-
N, 3-N, 4-Y); Biological, Non-Behavioural (1-Y, 2-Y/N, 3-N, 4-Y);
Behavioural/Social (1-Y, 2-Y/N, 3-Y, 4-N), Behavioural/Social +
Biological, Non-Behavioural (1-Y, 2-Y/N, 3-Y, 4-Y), Other
methodology (1-Y/N, 2-Y/N, 3-N, 4-N).
The five-year impact factor of the journal measured by the
Journal Citation Reports was recorded for each paper. Impact
factors were then normalized by discipline with mean zero and
standard deviation one (i.e. z-transformed).
Statistical analyses
The strength of the association between ranks of hardness and
ranks based on the proportion of positive results was tested with
Kendall’s t-c, that between ranks of hardness and positive/
negative outcome (which is a nominal category) was measured by
Cramer’s V.
The ability of independent variables to significantly predict the
outcome of a paper was tested by standard logistic regression
analysis, fitting a model in the form:
logit Yð Þ~ln pi
1{pi
 
~b0zb1Xi1z . . .zbnXin
in which pi is the probability of the ith paper of reporting a positive
or partial support, and X1,… Xn, represent the predictors tested in
each regression model, the details of which are specified in the
Results section. Statistical significance of the effect of each variable
was calculated through Wald’s test, and the relative fit of
regression models (variance explained) was estimated with
Nagelkerke’s adjusted R2.
Post-hoc statistical power estimations for X2 tests assumed
Cohen’s w=0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, for small, medium and large effects,
respectively. Post-hoc statistical power in logistic regression was
calculated for a hypothetical binary variable with bimodal
distribution and sample frequency equal to the average sample
frequency of all dummy variables in the relevant model (e.g. for a
regression with disciplinary domain, the average sample frequency
of biological and social sciences). This effect was contrasted to the
base-rate probability of the reference category (e.g. for disciplinary
domain, the proportion of positive results in physical sciences),
assuming no other predictors in the model (i.e. R2 = 0). Odds-
Ratio = 1.5, 2.5 and 4.5 were assumed to equal a small, medium
and large effect, respectively.
All analyses were produced using SPSS statistical package.
Power analyses were performed using the software G*Power 3.1
[73].
Figures
Confidence intervals in the graphs were also obtained by logit
transformation, using the following equations for the proportion
and standard error, respectively:
Plogit~Loge
p
1{pð Þ
 
SElogit~
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
np
z
1
n 1{pð Þ
s
Where p is the proportion of negative results, and n is the total
number of papers. Values for high and low confidence interval
were calculated and the final result was back-transformed in
percentages using the following equations for proportion and
percentages, respectively:
P~
ex
exz1
%~100P
Where x is either Plogit or each of the corresponding 95%CI
values.
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